Challenging Direct Democracy by Chemerinsky, Erwin
CHALLENGING DIRECT DEMOCRACY 
Erwin Chemerinsky* 
2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 293 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................293 
I. DIRECT DEMOCRACY IS UNDESIRABLE ...............................................294 
A. Direct Democracy is Inconsistent with the Structure and 
Philosophy of the Constitution ....................................................294 
B. Direct Democracy Often Makes for Faulty Lawmaking .............297 
C. Direct Democracy Distorts Citizens’ Policy Preferences ............299 
II. DIRECT DEMOCRACY IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.....................................301 
A. Direct Democracy Violates the Republican Form of Government 
Clause ..........................................................................................301 
B. Direct Democracy Measures Disadvantaging Minorities Violate 
the Equal Protection Clause.........................................................304 
C. Direct Democracy Measures Disadvantaging Minorities Should Be 
Subject to Strict Scrutiny.............................................................305 
CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................306 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Civil Rights Initiative in Michigan was adopted the day before 
this symposium on direct democracy was held at Michigan State University 
College of Law. 
Let there be no doubt of its effects: it’s going to be a devastating event 
for individuals of color throughout Michigan.  I can back this up by the ex-
perience of California, after a similar initiative, also championed by Ward 
Connerly, was passed there in 1996.  Statistics are available about the effect 
on admissions at the University of California Law Schools in the five years 
immediately after the passage of what was called their Proposition 209.  The 
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percentage of minority students at state law schools, like UCLA and Boalt, 
is a fraction of what it was at comparable private schools like Stanford and 
U.S.C.  The same effects have been seen in government contracting and 
employment.   
What I want to argue this evening is that the effects of Proposition 
209, or your Michigan Civil Rights Initiative, are not atypical with regard to 
initiatives, but are representative.  Time and again, initiatives are used to 
disadvantage minorities: racial minorities, language minorities, sexual ori-
entation minorities, political minorities.  Though I agree with so much of 
what has been said by the other speakers today, each of them, to some ex-
tent, supported the use of the initiative process.  Each of them, at least in 
some way, seemed to advocate direct democracy as a good thing, at least in 
some circumstances. 
I want to take a very different position.  I want to argue today that di-
rect democracy is undesirable and unconstitutional.  I want to argue to you 
that the Supreme Court should find that the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative 
is unconstitutional, and strike it down.  So I want to make two points.  First, 
I am going to argue that direct democracy is undesirable.  This is a norma-
tive argument; it’s not an argument about constitutional doctrine.  Second, I 
want to argue that direct democracy is unconstitutional, and make a series of 
different arguments as to why. 
I.  DIRECT DEMOCRACY IS UNDESIRABLE 
So let me start out with the first, arguing that direct democracy is un-
desirable.  Here I’m especially focusing on the initiative process, where 
citizens go out and get signatures on petitions, to qualify the things on the 
ballot.  You heard earlier that about twenty-four states have such initiatives, 
and the criticisms of them apply also to the referendum process, or even to 
amending state constitutions, especially when it can be done by majority 
vote. 
A.  Direct Democracy is Inconsistent with the Structure and Philosophy of 
the Constitution 
First, I’d argue that direct democracy is inconsistent with the structure 
and philosophy of the Constitution.  I’m not going to take this so far as to 
make the strong claim that that makes direct democracy unconstitutional, 
but if you think about what our Constitution is about in its commitments, 
direct democracy is very inconsistent with it.  I think above all, the United 
States Constitution seeks to balance majority rule with the rights of the mi-
nority.  This isn’t a profound observation; go back and read the Federalist 
Papers, and you get a sense that those who are most responsible for drafting 
our Constitution did want a society based on majority rule, but they were 
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very concerned about minority rights.  As many, most notably the late 
Julian Eule observed, there are three main ways in which our Constitution 
tries to balance majority rule with minority rights.  
One way is that we have laws adopted by representatives, and not di-
rectly by the people.  Second, we have a structure of government that in-
cludes separation of powers, and checks and balances, which serves to pro-
tect the rights of the minority.  Third, we put our enduring values, our most 
cherished commitments, in a Constitution that is very difficult to change.  I 
don’t think any of those three propositions is controversial.  Let me elabo-
rate, and show you why as to each, direct democracy can’t be reconciled 
with them. 
The structure of the Constitution is very much based on distrust of ma-
jorities.  The things we all learned in junior high school civics make that 
clear.  Look at the institutions of the federal government.  The President 
wasn’t chosen by direct, popular vote.  The President, as we all were re-
minded in 2000, is chosen through the Electoral College.  The Senate, at the 
time the Constitution was ratified, was selected by state legislatures.  It 
wasn’t until the Constitution was amended in the nineteenth century that 
there were direct elections of senators.  And of course, federal judges are 
picked by the President, and confirmed by the Senate.  Voters play no role 
in that.  Only the House of Representatives, out of all of the institutions of 
the federal government, can be said to be truly majoritarian.  That’s not ac-
cidental, of course.  That’s because the Framers deeply distrusted majorities.   
One might speak of this in pejorative terms as elitism, but it was based 
on the Framers’ study of history.  They were worried about factions, mob 
rule, and they were very much concerned with protecting the rights of the 
minority.  And so they structured a government where there’s not a mecha-
nism for a national plebiscite.  This was pointed out in the last discussion by 
Professor Sherman Clark.  From time to time, there have been proposals to 
create national plebiscites over national issues.  They never got anywhere.  
And I think the Framers would have been strongly condemning of the idea 
of a national plebiscite.  They wanted laws made by elected representatives.  
They didn’t trust the people: that’s why they structured the government the 
way that they did.  And of course, the government they structured was all 
about trying to diffuse power, to prevent tyranny.  That’s why, for instance, 
the federal government, as we learned in junior high school civics, has three 
branches, with a separate executive, legislative, and judicial power.  That’s 
why James Madison said in the Federalist Papers, “[t]he accumulation of all 
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may 
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”1 
  
 1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 249 (James Madison) (Gideon ed., George W. Carey 
& James McClellan eds., 2001). 
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The Framers also, of course, diffused power at the federal level in the 
sense of federalism; dividing power between the federal government and the 
states.  The Framers thought that the structure of government was the best 
way to protect individual rights, including the rights of minorities.  We all 
learned, at least in first-year constitutional law, that the Framers didn’t in-
clude a Bill of Rights in the original Constitution, partly because they 
thought it was unnecessary.  They thought that the structure of the govern-
ment that they created was sufficient to protect the rights of the minorities. 
Now my view of separation of powers is a simple one.  The Framers 
wanted to make sure that two branches of government were involved before 
government did anything important.  Generally, adopting a law takes an 
action by both the legislature and the executive.  Enforcing the law to put a 
person in prison requires prosecution by the executive and conviction by the 
courts.  Going to war requires two branches of government in the Constitu-
tion.  The same goes for approving a treaty, confirming a federal judge, and 
anything else of consequence.  One of the things that’s so troubling about 
direct democracy is that these structural protections fell to pieces.  You 
don’t need two separate bodies to be involved, only one.  The voters are 
able to take an action.  That’s sufficient to adopt a law.  The diffusion of 
power that comes from separation, from checks and balances, is completely 
absent. 
Moreover, of course, direct democracy allows precious commitments, 
including those found in state constitutions, to be changed by the majority 
of the voters.  When I teach constitutional law, I always begin the first class 
by asking my students to think about how the Constitution is different from 
any other law.  And of course, the answer is that any other statute passed by 
Congress can be changed by that, or the next, Congress.  It only takes a ma-
jority of two houses and agreement by the President to change any statute 
that Congress passes.  That’s of course generally true of state statutes or 
local ordinances.  But changing the United States Constitution is vastly dif-
ferent.  It takes approval of two-thirds of both houses of Congress and rati-
fication by three-quarters of the states.  That’s not accidental.   
The Framers wanted to make sure that our long-term commitments 
weren’t sacrificed to our short-term actions.  They created the Constitution 
as an elaborate edifice, to make sure that our short-term desires didn’t cause 
us to lose sight of our long-term commitments.  Direct democracy makes it 
so easy to compromise that a state constitution can be changed just by an 
initiative put before the voters. 
The whole of this, perhaps theoretical, does still come down to the no-
tion that the Framers were very concerned about protecting minorities.  
Now to be sure, as was pointed out earlier, the minorities that might have 
been of the greatest concern were wealthy, land-owning minorities.  The 
Framers weren’t concerned about racial minorities; if they were, they 
wouldn’t have written the Constitution that they did that institutionalized 
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slavery.  But with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, there 
was obviously much more concern for racial minorities, and our concern for 
minorities of all sorts in the political process is on that ground.   
The reality, as I’ve alluded to, as others have spoken to this afternoon, 
is that often the initiative process targets minorities of all sorts.  There’s no 
doubt that those who will suffer from the initiative passed yesterday here in 
Michigan are racial minorities.  That was the effect of Proposition 209 in 
California.  If you look at other initiatives passed, such as Proposition 187 
in California, it’s a no-benefits of any sort to go to undocumented immi-
grants; again you see a specific minority being targeted.  The English-only 
initiatives again are targeting a minority language.  The initiatives that have 
swept the country, now adopted in what is the majority of states, prohibiting 
same-sex marriage, are again trying to limit rights of the minority: gays and 
lesbians. 
Lest you doubt what I am saying about this, ask yourself the following 
question: when was the last time that the voters passed an initiative to in-
crease the rights of prisoners, or increase the rights of criminal defendants?  
It’s hard to think of illustrations of that.  The political process cannot be 
realistically used to protect the rights of minorities, at least not very often.  
So in this way, I believe that the initiative process, direct democracy, does 
come in conflict with our constitutional principles.   
B.  Direct Democracy Often Makes for Faulty Lawmaking 
But I would make another very different normative argument, and 
that’s that the initiative process often leads to lousy lawmaking; that the 
nature of the initiative process doesn’t lend itself to laws that are well- 
crafted, well-drafted, or very desirable.  There are many reasons for this.  
One is that the checks that exist in the drafting process are absent with re-
gard to initiatives.  Usually a bill is drafted by professional staff in a com-
mittee of the legislature.  It’s then forwarded to the committee to consider, 
then it goes to the entire body.  All the while, changes can be made.  In bi-
cameral legislatures, like the United States Congress, it will then likely go 
to another committee, considered by the entire body.  Differences, including 
language, are then reconciled by a conference committee.  It may be vetoed 
by the President, or Governor, based on language, and then go back through 
the process.  All of that does improve the quality of legislation.   
Earlier it was asked, well, can you really show that legislation is better 
than initiatives?  I think with regard to the quality of drafting, I can consis-
tently show that legislation is better drafted than laws adopted via the initia-
tive process.  This isn’t theoretical or hypothetical, and coming from where 
I live in California, I saw that when California re-instituted the death pen-
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alty, they did so by voter initiative.  This of course was after the Supreme 
Court, in Furman v. Georgia,2  invalidated the death penalty; then in Gregg 
v. Georgia,3 the Court said that the death penalty could come back under 
certain circumstances.  There was an initiative in California to reinstate the 
death penalty.  It was, by any measure, a terribly drafted initiative.   
And of course, it’s easy to understand why.  What does it take to get 
an initiative on the ballot?  Well, at least in California, it costs several mil-
lion dollars to do so, and that’s something we haven’t talked about today.  
And that limits who can use the initiative process.  But assuming you’ve got 
your several million dollars, you then can go out and hire people to gather 
signatures, you get enough signatures, and it’s on the ballot.  That’s all that 
it takes.  So if you have somebody who’s wealthy enough, or who has ac-
cess to enough resources, and they go out and get the signatures, it’s on the 
ballot.  They don’t need to vet the language of the initiative with anybody. 
As a result of this, in the first 60-some cases to come before the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, in the overwhelming majority of cases, the California 
Supreme Court unanimously overturned death sentences, based on the draft-
ing of the language.  It’s interesting that when Chief Justice Rose Bird was 
being reconsidered for the California Supreme Court in a retention election 
in 1986, opponents said that it’s because she never voted to uphold the 
death sentence.  In reality, in almost all of those cases, which were 7-0 or 6-
1 decisions to strike down death sentences, Rose Bird was virtually never 
even in a dissent.  Why was that?  Because the death penalty initiative was 
so poorly drafted.   
That’s not the only example of this, of course.  I can give you one 
more.  California voters, in 1994, passed a so-called “three strikes” initia-
tive.  The way that it’s drafted, unlike every other three strikes law in the 
country, is that the third strike doesn’t have to be a serious or a violent fel-
ony.  Any felony can count under the California three strikes law.  In Cali-
fornia, if someone commits shoplifting but has a prior conviction for a prop-
erty crime, the shoplifting can be charged as a felony.  I argued a case in the 
Supreme Court a few years ago, Lockyer v. Andrade.4  My client, Leandro 
Andrade, was sentenced to life in prison with no possibility of parole for 
fifty years, for stealing $152 worth of video tapes from K-mart stores in 
California.  He is one of 360 individuals who are serving a life sentence in 
California for petty theft with a prior offense, stealing less than $400 in 
merchandise.   
As part of representing Mr. Andrade, in both the Ninth Circuit, and at 
the United States Supreme Court, I exhaustively researched the history for 
this California ballot initiative.  It was all about wanting to put dangerous, 
  
 2. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 3. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 4. 538 U.S. 63 (2003). 
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violent felons in prison for life.  The focus was on Richard Allen Davis, 
who had kidnapped and murdered Polly Klaas.  There’s nothing in the legis-
lative history of the ballot initiative, or the media coverage, to indicate that 
there was ever a desire to put people in prison for petty theft, or possessing 
small amounts of any drugs.  I think if the initiative had gone through the 
usual legislative processes, this mistake would have been corrected.  But it 
wasn’t.  It was just an initiative that was drafted by a group that wanted 
tougher laws in regard to crime, and as a result, you do have people like 
Andrade serving life in prison with no possibility of parole for fifty years, 
for stealing a $152 in video tapes.   
Another aspect of the initiative process leads to lousy lawmaking: 
campaigns for initiatives are often deceptive.  People often vote about initia-
tives without really understanding what they’re about.  How many people 
who voted yesterday for the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative thought they 
were voting to advance the rights of racial minorities, to advance their civil 
rights?  We’ve heard two eminent professors from Michigan who said even 
they got a little bit twisted as they were trying to explain what the Civil 
Rights Initiative is about.  The same thing happened in California.   
C.  Direct Democracy Distorts Citizens’ Policy Preferences 
Now these were for high-profile initiatives.  Often initiatives are of a 
lower-profile nature.  There are also initiatives at the local government 
level.  Sometimes as you read ballot pamphlets, to say nothing of the adver-
tisements, you have no sense of what the initiative is going to do.  Califor-
nia had an initiative on the ballot a few years ago that would restrict deriva-
tive suits against corporations and class action suits against corporations.  I 
would criticize both the proponents and the opponents of this, because if 
you read all the ads, and all the literature, you’d have no sense about what it 
was about at all. 
The deliberative process, which the legislative process has much more 
than the initiative process, is just absent when this is going on.  Now I real-
ize there are those who would defend the initiative process.  There are those 
who would say, well, it’s responsive government.  The initiative process lets 
the voters speak.  I think that Professor Sherman Clark, earlier, developed a 
powerful argument as to why it’s false to see the initiative process as re-
flecting voter preferences.5 
I would elaborate his work, and the work of others, and develop a 
slightly different point that hasn’t been expressed, as to why the initiative 
process doesn’t reflect the will of the voters, and that’s because compromise 
  
 5. See Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L. 
REV. 434 (1998). 
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positions that reflect the majority of the voters often aren’t reflected in the 
initiative process, which is binary; you vote for it or against it; there’s no 
chance for compromise.  
Let me explain with a simple hypothetical.  Imagine that there’s an is-
sue where the positions could be lined up from zero to ten; zero being most 
extreme in one direction, and ten being most extreme at the other.  Usually 
those who are going to pay the money to have an initiative on the ballot are 
more towards the extremes than they are towards the middle.  And what 
they’re going to do is to try to put an initiative on the ballot that’s as far to 
their extreme position as can be, that is likely to be adopted by a majority of 
the voters.  And so, a simple hypothetical; those who support an initiative 
on a topic might want a ten initiative, but they think the best chance is to 
have an eight initiative, and there would be an eight initiative on the ballot.  
Imagine that most voters in the state are at six on that issue.  They’d like to 
do something.  They don’t want to go as far as the initiative, but they do 
want to do something.  Well, they would have a choice.  Vote for the eight 
initiative on the ballot, or do absolutely nothing.  
Now in the legislative process, a compromise could be reached.  You 
could come to the six that reflects the majority of the legislature, and hope-
fully the majority of the people.  But since voters don’t have that option, 
they’ve got to vote for the eight.  Now, it may very well be that the majority 
of voters believe in everything that was adopted yesterday in the Michigan 
Civil Rights Initiative.  But it might very well be that if they had a range of 
options, they would have picked something that was less extreme, that was 
more nuanced, perhaps something more towards the six, but that wasn’t an 
option.  I could give countless examples of this.  This, too, shows why you 
can’t assume that initiatives reflect the preference of the majority.   
A second criticism of my position may be that I’m not being suffi-
ciently nuanced as to the types of initiatives.  And you heard some discus-
sion that we should separate initiatives for perfecting the processes of gov-
ernment versus initiatives that target minorities.  Perhaps we should say, 
when it comes to initiatives that perfect the processes of government, we 
should be supportive of them, and we should only be critical of those that 
harm minorities.  I’m always skeptical of distinctions based on process ver-
sus substance.  I think one of the lessons we learned in our first-year civil 
procedure class is that process and substance are just labels, and you can 
really characterize almost anything as process or substance, if you try hard 
enough.  I think this is true here.   
Let me give you an example:  Proposition 13 was adopted by Califor-
nia voters to limit property taxes.  It limited property taxes to no more than 
one percent of assessed valuation, as determined at the time of purchase, 
and the increase in the value of the property doesn’t play much role in in-
creases in property taxes.  Now, one would say, I think, that this is an initia-
tive more about process than substance.  It’s all about the process of deter-
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mining valuation of property for the purpose of a property tax.  But this is 
an initiative that has had a devastating effect on racial minorities in the state 
of California, including by limiting the funding available for schools in 
California.  Of course, for those who are wealthy enough to send their kids 
to private schools, Proposition 13 doesn’t matter very much.  For those who 
send their kids to public schools in wealthy areas, they can supplement the 
money that’s gained through the property taxes because they are able to 
contribute for book funds, teacher funds, after-school funds, and all the rest.  
But for kids who go to public school in California, where education dollars 
are very much dependent on property taxes, Proposition 13 has had a terri-
ble and devastating effect.  Is it process, or is it substance?  Clearly, it’s 
some of both. 
If you accept my arguments in terms of the initiative process, I don’t 
need to convince you that every initiative is undesirable.  Frankly, I like 
some of the initiatives that were passed yesterday, such as those that in-
crease the minimum wage in many states.  But nonetheless, I would take as 
an overall position that the initiative process is undesirable for the reasons 
that I’ve suggested. 
II.  DIRECT DEMOCRACY IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Arguing that the initiative process is undesirable doesn’t make a con-
stitutional argument against it.  In the second part of my remarks, I want to 
argue that the initiative process is unconstitutional.  I’d like to make three 
levels of argument here, starting with the most general, and going to the 
most specific, or to put it another way, starting with the most dramatic and 
then going to the most specific.   
A.  Direct Democracy Violates the Republican Form of Government Clause 
My most dramatic argument is that the initiative process should be de-
clared unconstitutional because it violates the Republican Form of Govern-
ment Clause.6  This little-known provision says, “the United States shall 
guarantee to each state a republican form of government.”7  Now, contrary 
to the wishes of the current occupants of the White House, this provision 
has nothing to do with political parties.  If one goes back, and tries to ask 
what the Framers meant by a republican form of government, there’s a 
strong indication that they thought that a republican form of government 
was one where people would elect representatives, and the representatives 
would then make the laws.  They saw direct democracy as the antithesis of a 
republican form of government.   
  
 6. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 7. Id. 
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The problem, though, with challenging initiatives under the Republi-
can Form of Government Clause, is a case from the 1840s: Luther v. Bor-
den.8  Luther is one of the more extraordinary events in American constitu-
tional history.  It involved the State of Rhode Island, which didn’t have a 
state constitution.  It was still governed under a charter issued by King 
Charles in the seventeenth century, and there was terrible malapportion-
ment.  So the voters considered an initiative.  A new constitution passed.  
The existing government then made it a crime for anybody to participate in 
the election under the new constitution.  
Nonetheless, an election was held.  A man by the name of Doar was 
chosen as Governor.  He tried to govern for a few days.  Ultimately he and 
his supporters were arrested.  And a sheriff from the existing government 
broke into the house of somebody and said he was involved in the illegal 
election.  The person whose house was broken into sued for trespassing.  
The sheriff defended and said, “but I’m the government!  I’m not trespass-
ing, I’m engaging in a search.”  The person whose house was broken into 
said, “you’re not the legitimate government of Rhode Island, because you 
fail the Republican Form of Government Clause.”  To which the Supreme 
Court, seeing this mess said, “we want no part of it.”  The Supreme Court 
said cases under the Republican Form of Government Clause are a non-
justiciable political question. 
Now, as with any case, the Court’s holding was limited to these acts.  
It doesn’t need to be seen as saying that for all circumstances the Republi-
can Form of Government Clause is non-justiciable.  You might be surprised 
to know that in Plessy v. Ferguson,9 in Justice Harlan’s famous eloquent 
dissent, he invoked the Republican Form of Government Clause explicitly. 
He was trying to argue why “separate but equal” could never be constitu-
tional.10  However, in 1914, in Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. 
Oregon,11 the United States Supreme Court considered whether a challenge 
to the initiative process violated the Republican Form of Government 
Clause.  The Supreme Court, relying on Luther v. Borden, said challenges to 
the initiative process through the Republican Form of Government Clause 
are non-justiciable political questions.   
The effect of Luther v. Borden has been to render the Republican 
Form of Government Clause a nullity.  It’s never been used by any federal 
  
 8. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). 
 9. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 10. Id. at 564. (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Such a system is inconsistent with the guar-
anty given by the Constitution to each State of a republican form of government, and may be 
stricken down by Congressional action, or by the courts in the discharge of their solemn duty 
to maintain the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to 
the contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 11. 223 U.S. 118 (1912). 
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court, let alone the Supreme Court.  I can’t think of any other Supreme 
Court case that completely buried an entire clause.  The closest I can think 
of would be the Slaughter-House Cases,12 and the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.13  There are at least a couple of cases, 
including one in 1999, that used that provision.14 
I see no reason why the clause should always be regarded as a non-
justiciable political question.  In Baker v. Carr15 in 1962, the Supreme Court 
announced the criteria for determining if something is a political question.  
The Court said that one reason that something might be a political question 
is if there’s a lack of judicially discoverable or manageable standards.  But 
the Court could formulate judicially discoverable or manageable standards 
here.  If you accept my position, the Court could take the position that the 
initiative process is unconstitutional because the Republican Form of Gov-
ernment Clause doesn’t allow direct democracy.   
Another thing Baker v. Carr said was that things are political ques-
tions where there is a textual commitment to a specific branch of govern-
ment, such as if the Constitution says something is left to Congress.  But the 
language of Article IV, Section 4, is “the United States shall guarantee each 
state a republican form of government.”16  That includes the federal courts, a 
branch of the United States government. 
In 1992, in a case called New York v. United States,17 the Supreme 
Court returned to the Republican Form of Government Clause.  The federal 
government required that every state clean up its nuclear waste by 1996.  
Any state that failed to do so by that date maintained title to the nuclear 
waste, and was liable for any harms it caused.  One of the arguments made 
to the Supreme Court was that it violated the Republican Form of Govern-
ment Clause for Congress to commandeer the states in this way.  Justice 
O’Connor, at the beginning of her majority opinion, said that the Court 
should reconsider whether challenges to the Republican Form of Govern-
ment Clause are justiciable.  She said that there’s no reason to believe that 
they are always non-justiciable.  She then said that the Court needn’t do that 
in this case because the law violates the Tenth Amendment.18  I think this is 
an open invitation to bring challenges under the Republican Form of Gov-
ernment Clause, to convince courts that cases are not necessarily non-
justiciable.  If a court is willing to find such a case justiciable, then you get 
to my argument, that direct democracy is inherently inconsistent with the 
  
 12. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
 13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2. 
 14. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
 15. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 16. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (emphasis added). 
 17. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 18. Id. at 183-86. 
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Republican Form of Government Clause, the same argument that was made 
in Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph over ninety years ago.  I think it’s 
an argument that should be revived today.  Indeed, I would say especially as 
to initiatives that target and harm minorities, the Republican Form of Gov-
ernment Clause argument should be revived. 
I’m very skeptical of Framers’ intent arguments in any context, but I 
think I can make a strong Framers’ intent argument that the Framers were 
very concerned about protecting minorities, and for that reason they dis-
avowed direct democracy and saw the Republican Form of Government 
Clause as the embodiment of that. 
B.  Direct Democracy Measures Disadvantaging Minorities Violate the 
Equal Protection Clause 
Well, that’s my broadest argument as to why direct democracy is un-
constitutional.  Let me move to a slightly more specific argument.  And that 
would be, initiatives that disadvantage minorities from using the political 
process should be regarded as unconstitutional.  And for this reason, regard-
less of the Republican Form of Government Clause argument, the Michigan 
Civil Rights Initiative should be declared unconstitutional. 
Here I think I have strong support from Supreme Court decisions.  The 
most notable of these is Romer v. Evans,19 from 1996.  It involved a Colo-
rado initiative that repealed all laws protecting gays and lesbians from dis-
crimination and prohibited any new laws in the state from protecting gays 
and lesbians from discrimination.  The United States Supreme Court, in a 6-
3 decision, declared this initiative unconstitutional.  Justice Kennedy wrote 
the opinion for the Court.  He stressed that the Colorado initiative kept gays 
and lesbians from using the political process, noting that all other groups 
could do so.  If a lot of investors wanted to go to the Colorado legislature 
and seek some form of preferential treatment, they could do so.  If journal-
ists wanted to go to the Colorado legislature, and seek some form of prefer-
ential treatment, they could do so.  If law professors wanted to ask the Colo-
rado legislature to adopt a law that prohibited discrimination against them, 
if journalists wanted that, or any other group, they could.   
But one group was kept from using the political process: gays and les-
bians.  They were not allowed to go to the political process and get any laws 
protecting themselves from discrimination, or any laws giving them prefer-
ence.  The United States Supreme Court declared this unconstitutional.  
Strikingly, Justice Kennedy’s opinion used rational basis review, and said 
that keeping a group from using the political process would not serve any 
legitimate purpose and denies equal protection.   
  
 19. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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This isn’t the only time the Supreme Court has said this.  You might 
think back to the Seattle school case,20 where voters passed an initiative to 
prohibit busing from being used.  The United States Supreme Court said to 
prohibit a remedy for segregation, and to prohibit busing in this way, keeps 
minorities from using the political process, and that inherently denies equal 
protection.   
One might go back to an even earlier case, Hunter v. Erickson,21 that 
limited the ability of the government to adopt open housing laws.  I think 
what these cases stand for is, if an initiative keeps a minority from using the 
political process in the way that all others can use the political process, that 
inherently denies equal protection.  Isn’t that exactly what the Michigan 
Civil Rights Initiative passed yesterday does?  The Supreme Court, in Grut-
ter v. Bollinger,22 said that colleges and universities have a compelling in-
terest in having a diverse student body.  The Michigan Civil Rights Initia-
tive says that minorities in Michigan cannot use the political process, even 
to pursue what the Supreme Court has expressly labeled a “compelling gov-
ernment interest.”  Isn’t that disadvantaging minorities in a way that no 
other group is disadvantaged from using the political process?  In that way, 
aren’t Romer v. Evans and the Seattle School District case very much on 
point?  
C.  Direct Democracy Measures Disadvantaging Minorities Should Be Sub-
ject to Strict Scrutiny 
But if neither of these arguments have persuaded you, let me make 
even a more limited argument.  I would say that at the very least, strict scru-
tiny should be used for initiatives that disadvantage minorities from exercis-
ing their rights.  This is an argument that the late UCLA law professor 
Julian Eule advanced in a wonderful Yale Law Journal article, Judicial Re-
view of Direct Democracy.23  The underlying philosophy of this approach, in 
Professor Eule’s argument, was that the level of scrutiny used reflects the 
degree of suspicion about the legislative process.   
Generally there’s trust in the legislative process.  So there’s great def-
erence to the legislative process; that’s why rational basis is generally used.  
But in those instances where we’re very distrustful of the legislature, well 
that’s where strict scrutiny gets used.  And if we’re somewhat distrustful, 
but not as much, it’s intermediate scrutiny.  But we all learned in first-year 
constitutional law that the levels of scrutiny track the degree of distrust of 
the legislative process.  Professor Eule argues, I think persuasively, that 
  
 20. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982). 
 21. 393 U.S. 385 (1969). 
 22. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 23. Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503 (1990). 
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there’s great reason to be distrustful of the initiative process, especially if it 
bears upon the rights and interests of minorities, upon fundamental rights.  
Then the question would be whether an initiative like the Michigan Civil 
Rights Initiative would meet strict scrutiny.   
CONCLUSION 
My preference would be to see the initiative process declared uncon-
stitutional in all circumstances and for all uses.  At the very least I think 
initiatives that keep minorities from using the political process should be 
declared unconstitutional.  But if that’s not possible, then strict scrutiny 
should be used. 
I have to admit to you I come to this position having lived in Califor-
nia for twenty-one years.  I grew up in Chicago, and initiatives rarely are 
used in the State of Illinois.  I’ve got to admit that for all the years growing 
up, going to college, teaching law, I don’t remember any initiatives on the 
ballot.  And then I remember when I moved to California in 1983, for the 
very first election, November 1984, getting in the mail a telephone-sized 
pamphlet that listed all the ballot initiatives and statements for and against 
them.   
Now what hasn’t been mentioned is, you don’t get these only for state 
elections.  There are also ballot initiatives at the local level; for example, 
amendments to the city charter come by virtue of ballot initiatives.  In 1999, 
the voters of Los Angeles considered whether to adopt a new city charter.  It 
was 168 pages long, single-spaced, and came to the voters as a pamphlet 
that they had to vote up or down on.   
Having lived through that system for twenty-one years, having 
watched it, I really came to the conclusion that the Framers of our Constitu-
tion were right here.  That direct democracy isn’t the way to adopt laws.  
And so that’s why when asked to present this keynote to you, I decided to 
present the strongest argument, that it is lousy lawmaking, and that it should 
be found to be unconstitutional. 
